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The EU, Israel and the "Arab Spring" States

Israel-EU Security and Defense Relations in the Context of the “Arab Spring”

Les relations de défense et de sécurité entre Israël et l'Union Européenne (UE) en vue du Printemps Arabe
Tsilla Hershco

Résumés

Cette étude porte sur les relations de défense et de sécurité entre Israël et l'Union Européenne (UE) en vue des événements du « Printemps Arabe ». Il décrit les convergences et les divergences sur les questions liées au « Printemps Arabe », comme le conflit israélo-palestinien, le Hamas, les événements révolutionnaires en Égypte, la guerre civile syrienne, le Liban, le Hezbollah et le projet nucléaire iranien. Il met ensuite en lumière les principaux domaines de la coopération de défense et de sécurité qui sont en effet plus importants sur le plan bilatéral entre Israël et les États membres de l'UE qu'avec l'UE elle-même. L'article souligne les préoccupations et les intérêts stratégiques communs d'Israël et de l'UE qui rendent la coopération politique et sécuritaire indispensable en vue d'un Moyen-Orient extrêmement instable et explosif.

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  • 1 For more details on the strategic relations prior to the “Arab Spring” see: Caroline du Plessix, “T (...)

1The relations between Israel and the EU, since their establishment in 1959 with the EEC (European Economic Community), are characterized as exceptionally ambiguous. In fact, over the years Israel and the EU have established a large scale of economic, commercial, scientific and cultural cooperation on the one hand but have developed deep political and security disagreements on the other hand. Concurrently the EU member states and Israel have built up significant defense and security cooperation. However, the defense and security cooperation between Israel and the EU has remained rather limited. The security and defense elations have known ups and downs. They suffered setbacks during periods of Israeli-Palestinian military conflicts, such as following the outburst of the Second Intifada (2000), the Second Lebanese War (2006) or following Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip (2008). However, the process of the strengthening of defense and security cooperation has continued essentially as a result of shared strategic concerns such as the terrorist threats and the Iranian nuclear project.1

  • 2 European Commission, EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years, Februar (...)

2The upheaval in the Arab world, which has started in 2011, added some more aspects to the already complex Israel-EU relations. Israeli and EU’s opinions have initially diverged over their assessment of the geostrategic ramifications of the so called Arab Spring. Thus, while the EU has stressed the potential positive emergence of democratic regimes as a result of the revolutionary events in the region,2 Israel has underlined the more realistic prospects of enduring instability, at least in the short and medium terms. Concurrently with the basic differences in their stances vis-à-vis the upheaval in the region, Israel and the EU also share growing security concerns resulting in defense cooperation.

3This article focuses on Israel-EU security and defense relations in the context of the “Arab Spring”. It starts by presenting some major Israel-EU security and defense perceptions and factors which have shaped Israel-EU defense and security relations before the “Arab Spring” and examines the impact on these relations in the context of the “Arab Spring”. It displays the divergences and convergences over issues related to the “Arab Spring” such as the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the Hamas, Egypt’s revolutionary events, the Syrian Civil war, Lebanon and Hezbollah and the Iranian nuclear project. It goes on to briefly highlight some main areas of defense and security cooperation between Israel and the EU as well the bilateral defense cooperation between Israel and the EU member states. It concludes with some prospects and recommendations for the future.

Israel-EU Divergences and Convergences

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

4The major factor which has shaped Israel-EU relations in general and specifically its security and defense cooperation relates to the substantial disagreements over the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Basically, already before the “Arab Spring” the EU has asserted that the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict consists of the creation of a viable Palestinian state living in peace with Israel within the 1967 borders with slight negotiated territorial exchanges and with East Jerusalem as its capital. The EU has claimed that this solution would guarantee Israel’s security.3 The EU has often emphasized its strategic high priority interest in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Following the upheaval in the region the EU has accentuated its warnings regarding the urgency of the resolution of the conflict, which the EU perceives as an essential part in addressing the region’s instability. That is evident, for instance, from a policy statement on the EU official External Action Service (EEAS): “Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Until this is achieved, there will be little chance of solving other problems in the Middle East”.4 The EU’s point of view regarding the urgency of the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in view of the “Arab awakening” is evident in the speech of Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in June 2012: “I have been very clear from the beginning of the Arab awakening that developments in the region make the peace process and a negotiated solution even more urgent and important, not less. While we are all paying a lot of attention to the situation in Syria, Egypt and elsewhere, ending the conflict remains a top priority and a fundamental EU interest. As for Israel the main source of concern remains the repercussions of the Arab Spring in its direct neighborhood”.5

  • 6 See for example: Catherine Ashton, Speech on the Latest Developments in the Middle East & Syria, Ju (...)

5In addition, the EU has argued consistently before and after the “Arab Spring” that the Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria are illegal under international law. The EU has defined the settlements as its key concern and has often condemned Israeli decisions to expand them stressing that they constitute an impediment to the realization of the two states solution. Following the peace initiative of US Secretary of State John Kerry the EU has multiplied its condemning statements, warning that the settlements could undermine the ongoing negotiations.6

  • 7 See for example: Lazar Berman, Netanyahu: Palestinian Incitement Behind Terror Attack, October 6, 2 (...)

6Israel, while declaring that it also supports the two-state solution, is skeptical regarding the sincerity of the Palestinian Authority as well as its capacity to create a peaceful state alongside Israel. Thus, Israel has criticized the worrisome phenomena of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic incitement within the Palestinian Authority. Israel perceives the anti-Israeli indoctrination, manifested in the Palestinian Authority textbooks, its formal media and its worship of jihadists and terrorists, as a factor which encourages terror acts against Israeli citizens.7

  • 8 FM Avigdor Liberman, Joint press conference following 10th EU-Israel Association Council meeting, F (...)
  • 9 Efraim Inbar, The 2011 Arab Uprising and Israel’s National Security, The Begin-Sadat Center for Str (...)

7Israel also disagrees with the EU perception regarding the urgency of the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a result of the current upheaval in the region. Israel claims that despite the importance of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, there is no linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the current instability in the Middle East, which is caused by internal economic and political factors.8 Consequently Israel has evoked the need to exercise prudence in view of its hostile, unstable strategic environment as well as the tangible risk that extreme Muslim groups gain control of Arab states.9

  • 10 The Prime Minister’s Speech at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, (...)

8Accordingly, Israel ascribes more importance to the concept that the two-state solution should include defense guarantees such as the demilitarization of the future Palestinian state. Additionally, Israel regards the concept of maintaining defensible borders as crucial for preserving its capacity for self defense as well as attaining a lasting peace agreement in the future.10

  • 11 Prof. Efraim Inbar, Building in Jerusalem: A Strategic Imperative, BESA Center Perspectives Papers, (...)
  • 12 See for example: Nicholas Rostow, Are the Settlements Illegal? The American Interest, March-April 2 (...)
  • 13 Max Singer, Israeli Backers of the Two-State Solution Should Support the Levy Report, April 28, 201 (...)
  • 14 Raphael Ahren, EU slams Israel over settlements, but stops short of calling for sanctions, The Time (...)
  • 15 Lazar Berman, "Liberman Summons EU Envoy Over One-Sided Policies, January 17, 2014. http://www.time (...)

9In this context, Israel perceives territorial continuity, especially between Maaleh Adumim and Jerusalem and hence the building in the controversial E1 zone, as an essential security measure, since it connects Maaleh Adumim to Jerusalem and ensures secure access to the strategic Jordan River Valley.11 In addition, legal reports of Israeli and non Israeli jurists claim that the settlements are compatible with international law.12 A commission, appointed by Israeli government and headed by former supreme court judge Edmond Levy, states that the settlements are legal under international law. It criticizes, however, the unauthorized outposts.13 Furthermore, Israel argues that there is no connection between the settlements and the peace agreements. Hence, the settlements were not an obstacle for peace with Egypt or Jordan. Additionally, Israel emphasizes that even though it has evacuated settlements in Gaza it was retaliated by rockets. Israel also claims, in contrast to the EU, that the main obstacle to the resolution of the conflict is the refusal of the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and not the settlements.14 Israel has gone even further and accused the EU as being one sided in its criticism of Israeli settlements while ignoring the unilateral steps of the Palestinian Authority such as its appeal on April 1st, 2014 to join 15 international institutions thus breaching former understandings.15

  • 16 Herb Kenon, "Netanyahu: Gov’t okayed E1 planning, not building, December 2, 2012", http://www.jpost (...)

10No wonder that Israel-EU relations have recently undergone some crises reflecting to a great extent their opposing perceptions regarding the settlements. On November-December 2012 a significant crisis occurred on the backdrop of the UN General Assembly vote, which granted the Palestinian Authority a non-member observer state status with the support of most EU members. The Israeli government has subsequently authorized the building of 3,000 houses in the E1 zone, which links Maaleh Adumim and Jerusalem. The decision drew EU harsh criticism and some members even raised the option of recalling their ambassadors.16

11A more serious crisis occurred in July 2013, when the EU has published its policy guidelines for labeling the settlements products. The guidelines included the banning of cooperation with Israeli institutions operating in the settlements. The proposed guidelines also stipulated that any new agreement with Israel, such as “Horizon 2020” which is the EU program for innovative research and development, should include Israel’s statements that the Jewish communities in the West Bank and the Golan Heights are not part of Israel and therefore are not covered by the new agreements.17 Israel has rejected the European new guidelines insisting that the EU interferes on issues which belong to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation table, and that Israel’s borders will not be determined by the European Commission guidelines but by negotiations between the concerned parties.18 The Israeli-EU guidelines crisis was temporarily contained after the U.S. requested the EU to delay its decision to label products from Israeli settlements so as not to harm US Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to revive the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.19 In addition both the EU and Israel have expressed their willingness to find a solution which would enable Israel to join the Horizon 2020 program, in accordance with the interests of both sides.20 Thus, Israel is interested in the prospects of the lucrative investments in its scientific research and development projects while the EU is interested in Israeli high-technology capabilities.

Hamas

  • 21 Tsilla Hershco, Sarkozy’s Policy in the Middle East: A Break with the Past?, Insight Turkey, vol 11 (...)

12Israel’s use of force against terrorist organizations such as Hamas in Gaza, which targets Israel’s civilian population with missiles, has repeatedly constituted a point of contention between Israel and the EU. During operation Cast Lead in winter 2008 /2009 the EU criticized Israel even though it expressed its support for Israel’s right for self-defense. For instance, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, during the French EU presidency, labeled disproportionate the operation as soon as it started.21

  • 22 Catherine Ashton, Speech on the latest developments in the Middle East & Syria, June 12, 2012. http (...)
  • 23 EU HR Ashton deeply concerned by escalating violence in Israel and Gaza, November 16, 2012. http:// (...)

13During the period which preceded the Israeli Defense Pillar in Gaza, a period marked by persistent firing of missiles by Hamas, the EU expressed its commitment to Israel’s security: “The EU remains unequivocally committed to the security of Israel, including with regard to vital threats in the region. We condemn all forms of violence against civilians, including rocket attacks from Gaza."22 Furthermore, the EU relatively moderated its criticism of Israeli operation Defense Pillar on November 2012 stressing Israel’s right to protect its population from the rockets fired by the Hamas. The EU, however, urged Israel ”to ensure that its response is proportionate“.23

14Another point of divergence relates to the EU often pronounced demand from Israel to remove its blockade on the Gaza strip claiming that it violates international law. Israel regards the blockade on Gaza as a top security issue intended to prevent Hamas intensive smuggling of weapons. Israel argues that the Gaza blockade is compatible with international law, since Israel enables a constant supply of goods to the civil population, except for war materials.24

  • 25 Aaron Kalman, EU Denies It May Remove Hamas from the Terror List, December 4, 2012. http://www.time (...)

15The emerging reconciliation between the Palestinian authority and the Hamas in Gaza has created a new European-Israeli bone of contention. Thus, the EU, which has underlined on numerous occasions in the past that such reconciliation would constitute an important contribution to the Palestinian state building, has welcomed the reconciliation on condition that the Hamas adheres to three requirements: recognition of Israel’s right to exist, renouncing terror and abiding by the agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinian authority.25

16The EU also urged for the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian talks despite the PA-Hamas reconciliation deal. Israel, in contrast to the EU, regards this deal as a game changer, stressing that amid the talks with Israel, Abu-Mazen has reached an agreement with the Hamas, a terrorist organization whose covenant calls for the destruction of Israel.26

Egypt

  • 27 Catherin Ashton, Speech by EU HR Ashton on the situation in Egypt, September 11, 2013. http://www.e (...)

17The revolutionary events in Egypt, resulting in the ousting of President Husni Mubarak in February 2011 triggered the election of Muhamed Mursi as the President of Egypt on June 2012. Morsi was toppled in a military “coup d’Etat” following mass manifestations as a result of Egyptian public resentment regarding Mursi’s endeavors to impose an Islamic constitution as well as regarding the deteriorating economy and security in Egypt. Both Israel and the EU are concerned about the tumultuous events in Egypt. The EU, on numerous occasions, has expressed its concerns regarding the turmoil which might jeopardize the establishment of a democratic regime in Egypt.27

  • 28 Amos Harel, Israel believes Hamas won’t hesitate to attack again, despite growing isolation, Septem (...)
  • 29 Israel Defense Forces, "IDF Soldiers Unveil Terror Tunnel in Gaza Once Again", March 21, 2014. http (...)

18In Israel, concerns focus mainly on the ominous repercussions of the Egyptian upheaval on its immediate security. Thus, the weakening of the Egyptian grip over Sinai led to the strengthening of the extremist Muslim groups there. In fact, before the toppling of Morsi, Hamas has profited of the turmoil in Egypt as well as the favorable attitudes of Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government in order to smuggle weapons, missiles and other commodities through tunnels in the Sinai to the Gaza strip. The Hamas’ activists have also benefited of the jihadist infrastructure in Sinai to carry out missile attacks against Israel as for example the rocket attack on Eilat on April 17, 2013. Indeed, the ousting of Morsi, the closing of numerous smuggling tunnels and the crackdown of the Sissi regime on the Islamists in Sinai have weakened the Hamas. However, Israel is currently concerned that the Hamas, being pushed into the corner, might resume its terror attacks on Israel.28 These concerns seem to become more tangible with the recent missiles attacks against Israeli territory as well as the exposure of the three Hamas terror tunnels in Israeli territory during 2013 as well as on March 2014.29

Syria

19A major security concern to both Israel and the EU resides in the escalation of the civil war in Syria and its enormous humanitarian crisis. In addition, the situation in Syria constitutes a common concern to Israel as well as to the EU due the involvement of Al Qaida affiliated terrorist groups in the civil war.30 Furthermore, both Israel and the EU are concerned by the possible spillover of the crisis into bordering countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Israel) since it risks to turn the crisis into a regional or even global conflict, mainly as result of the military involvement of Hezbollah and Iran in the conflict. The EU is equally concerned by the spillover of the Syrian conflict into the EU member states as evident from the phenomena of western youngsters joining the ranges of Al-Qaeda affiliated rebels in Syria.31

  • 32 European External Action Service, Frequently Asked Questions on EU restrictive measures against the (...)
  • 33 Council of the European Union, November 19, 2012, Council Conclusions on Syria, http://www.consiliu (...)

20Despite the shared security concerns, Israel and the EU have shaped different perceptions and positions regarding the Syrian civil war. The EU, in contrast to Israel has overtly expressed its support for the Syrian opposition. Following the violent repression of the anti government protests the EU imposed an embargo on arms and oil exports to and from Syria. Additionally, the EU has suspended its association agreement with Syria.32 The EU has also provided humanitarian, economic and diplomatic support to the opposition. On November 2012 The EU has even recognized the National Coalition as the “legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the Syrian people”.33 At the same time, however, the EU has firmly opposed any military intervention such as imposing a no-fly zone without the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate.

21On May 2013 the issue of renewing the arms embargo on Syria seriously divided the EU. France and Britain have tried in vain to convince the other EU member states to lift the arms embargo and deliver weapons to the opposition with the purpose of ending the stalemate. They have claimed that this should be done with caution in order to prevent arms from falling into the hands of Al-Qaeda affiliated factions such as Jabhat al-Nusra.34

22A slight hardening in the tone of the EU occurred on August 21, 2013 following the murderous chemical attacks of the Assad regime against its citizens. The EU called on the UN Security Council to intervene against the Assad regime. It opposed, however, French declared willingness to join the US in a military intervention against the Assad regime. Subsequently, the EU embraced the Russian diplomatic intervention which led to Assad’s formal agreement to give up his chemical arsenal despite the vagueness of its full implementation.35

23Israel’s reaction to the Syrian crisis is different from that of the EU. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Israel has declared that it did not intend to intervene on behalf of one of the sides in Syria. Israel has stressed, however, that it would intervene only to stop the shipments of Iranian game changing advanced arms to Hezbollah. In fact, the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah, which is forbidden by UNSC decision 1701 (2006), is considered as an immense threat to Israel’s security. That was the reason behind Israel’s air raids against Syrians convoys of missiles designated to be delivered to the Hezbollah. In view of Syrian threats over Israel’s air strike and the incidents of spillover of the Syrian civil war into Israeli territory, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has clarified: ”Israel won’t intervene in Syria if not targeted“.36 Defense Minister Yaalon reacted similarly on the lethal mass killing of Syrians by chemical arms and US declared intention to militarily intervene in Syria: ”We aren’t getting involved in what is happening in Syria… we aren’t supporting or involved in a possible strike“.37 It is to be noted that the EU in its reaction to the Israeli strike in Syria has not revealed any understanding for the Israeli concerns regarding the transfer of advanced missiles to the Hezbollah. Thus, Ashton’s spokesman, Michael Mann expressed the EU formal disapproval for the Israeli strike: “We are looking with great concern at the recent developments in and around Syria that risk dragging the region into an increasingly violent and expanding conflict”.38

Lebanon and Hezbollah

  • 39 E.B. Picali, "Rift In Hizbullah And Among Its Shi’ite Supporters Due To Its Military Involvement In (...)

24The spillover of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon created a common point of concern to the EU and to Israel. The participation of Hezbollah in the war on the side of Assad in the repression of the opposition forces has created a rift within the ranges of Hezbollah itself as well as among its Shiites supporters.39 Hezbollah’s involvement in the war in Syria also caused armed clashes between Sunni activists and the Hezbollah. In view of these developments the EU has expressed its concern over the prospect of further destabilization of the already fragile Lebanese regime.

  • 40 Raphael Aaren, Why won’t Europe state the obvious about Hezbollah?, February 6, 2013. http://www.ti (...)

25The EU concerns for the stability of Lebanon played a major role in its past rejection of Israeli and US demand to include the Hezbollah on its list of terror organizations. These demands were strengthened following the publication of the Bulgarian investigation report which ascribed to Hezbollah the bombing perpetrated in Burgas, Bulgaria in July 2012 against Israeli tourists.40

26However, on July 2013 The EU agreed to add the Hezbollah’s military wing to the terror list but not its political faction.41 This decision resulted of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the Assad regime. Israel, while expressing its satisfaction with the initiative, criticized the decision as ineffective since the political and military factions of Hezbollah are not divided. The Hezbollah itself stated that the decision had no significance for its activity.42

27The divergences between Israel and the EU regarding the blacklisting of the Hezbollah demonstrate that even in cases where both of them have common concerns, as in the case of the stability of Lebanon, they often diverge over the course of action regarding the issue.

Iran

28Iran’s nuclear project is perceived by Israel as well as by the EU, as an issue of top security importance. Indeed, both Israel and the EU perceive a nuclearized Iran as a major threat to the world’s security. The EU has even initiated several rounds of severe sanctions aimed at influencing Iran to withdraw its support for this project.43 The Iranian growing influence in the region, mainly through its support for Assad in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon, constitute another common concern of the EU and Israel. However, Israel and the EU have opposing stances concerning the use of military force as a last resort in case of the failure of the diplomatic and economic measures to stop the project. This different perception was well evident in their attitudes towards the “charm offensive” of Rouhani’s, the newly elected Iranian President. Thus, while the EU has expressed its determination to seek diplomatic solution, Israel has persisted in presenting its skeptical attitudes, claiming that Iran was clearly striving to gain time in order to reach the irreversible point.44 The EU-Israel divergence has increased due to the expressions of willingness within the EU member states to ease the sanctions on Iran, as expressed by high level British and French delegates visiting Israel on October 2013.45 Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, manifesting skeptical attitudes regarding the Iranians’ intentions, and taking seriously Iran’s threats regarding Israel, urged France and Britain not to ease the sanctions until Iran abandons its nuclear project.46 During the Geneva talks between the Iranians and P5+1 powers (the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia and China) coordinated by Catherine Ashton , the EU manifested its inclination to sign a deal with the Iranians which was severely criticized by Israel. A last minute French hard line, demanding the full suspension of the activity at the heavy water reactor in Arak, the downgrading of its stockpile of enriched uranium from 20 percent to 5 percent, and not recognizing Iran’s right to enrich uranium, temporarily blocked the agreement with Iran.47 However, on October 24, an interim deal was signed between the six powers and Iran, easing the sanctions on Iran in return for Iran’s partial agreement to restrict its nuclear program and put it under international inspection. The EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, praised the deal for creating time and space “for talks aimed at reaching a comprehensive solution to the dispute”.48 Israel, however, has denounced the deal as a victory to the Iranians, since they obtained the easing of the sanctions without giving any commitment regarding the dismantlement of their nuclear capabilities.49

Israel-EU Defense Cooperation

  • 50 The European Foreign and Security Policy: Common Policies or aggregation of national diplomacies, E (...)

29Despite the numerous political and security divergences presented thus far, common perceptions of threats such as the Iranian nuclear program, the upheaval in the Arab world and mainly the bloodshed in Syria, the increase in the number of radical Islamic groups, international terror, the cyber war and so forth, have fostered defense and security cooperation mainly on the bilateral level with the EU member states. Defense and security cooperation between Israel and the EU is more limited, inter alia, since the EU as a whole has not yet succeeded to formulate and implement a significant common defense policy.50

  • 51 For the strategic dialogue with France see: Tsilla Hershco, French-Israeli security cooperation in (...)

30One aspect of defense and security cooperation is displayed in the regular strategic dialogues between Israel and the EU member states such as France, Britain and Germany. This kind of strategic dialogues involve the exchange of intelligence assessments on central geo-strategic international and regional issues.51

  • 52 Shaon Pardo and Joel Peters, Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union, Lexington Books, 2010 (...)
  • 53 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The European Union Upgrades its Relations with Israel, June 16, (...)
  • 54 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DFM Ayalon Opens Strategic Dialogue , September 6, 2010. http:/ (...)
  • 55 Rachel Oswald, EU Urges 2013 Conference on Mideast WMD-Free Zone, January 18, 2013, http://www.nti. (...)

31In 2008, the EU decided to upgrade its relations with Israel within the European Common Foreign and Security Policy-CFSP and also to organize a diplomatic-strategic dialogue between Israel and the EU.52 Indeed, according to Israeli Foreign office statements, Israel joined the EU’s Research and Development-R&D program and has gained more access to political and defense policy committees.53 In September 2010, Israel and the EU held a dialogue on weapons control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).54 The EU has tried to initiate an international conference on WMD designed to take place in 2013. It has stressed the urgency in creating a Middle East free of WMD in view of the upheaval in the region. However, following the Arab states proposal of a resolution at a UN nuclear agency in Vienna, which has intended to criticize Israeli “nuclear capabilities”, Israel refused to participate in the conference. The US joined Israel in its criticism about the Arab tendency to single Israel out.55

  • 56 See for example: IDF Chief of the General Staff Makes Historic Visit to Germany, November 7, 2013. (...)
  • 57 Anshel Pfeffer, Israel hosts Italian Air Force for joint training exercise December 17, 2011. http: (...)
  • 58 Anshel Pfeffer, "Israel Air Force conducts drills for long range attack", November 2, 2011. http:// (...)

32Other visible aspects of Israeli-EU security and defense relations are displayed in mutual visits of high ranking personalities56 and through joint military training exercises such as the joint Israeli-Italian, Israeli-Greek Israeli-Polish and Israeli-Italian air force exercises in the years 2010 to 2013.57 There were also common drills with other European state within the framework of NATO’s military drills.58

  • 59 Hershco, French-Israeli Security cooperation.

33Additionally, Israel and EU member states regularly implement numerous arms deals despite the controversy that such deals occasionally stir up in the EU public opinion. For instance, France, Germany and other EU states have purchased drones from Israel since the 1990’s, as Israeli drones have won a world-wide reputation for their advanced technology. The procurement of drones from Israel is motivated by military necessity, as European states only took notice of the value of drones in modern warfare long after Israel had drawn this conclusion. Consequently, many of the EU states have reached the decision that buying Israeli drones would be less costly and would provide a more promising outcome than developing them. Additional attractive factors of Israeli drones relate to Israel’s practical field experience while operating drones as an effective weapon in the asymmetric battle against terrorists. Another significant attractive factor relates to Israel’s willingness to sell the drones with their technology, in contrast to the US which sells military products “off the shelf” without their technologies. However, along with the procurement of Israeli drones, EU members such as France, Britain Germany, Spain, and Italy have launched research and development projects of a European Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-UAV, which up to now have not shown the desired results. Alongside the pragmatic military considerations which push the EU members to buy Israeli drones as well as other military products such as advanced missiles, there are political pressures to withhold arms deals with Israel. For instance, the newly elected Socialist French government has decided to suspend the former administration’s decision to buy advanced “Heron TP” drones from Israel. However this annulment, that was made due to variety of considerations, is seemingly not yet final.59

34Within Israeli’s arms deals with the EU member states it is important to point out the six submarines deals with Germany which have a major strategic value to Israel. Three of the submarines were already provided, two other are expected during 2014 and the third in 2018.60

35It is estimated that the EU’s potential of further deepening its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) might also affect Israeli-EU defense and security cooperation. Seemingly the defense and security cooperation is relatively easier within the bilateral relations with the EU member states than within the framework of the EU. Thus, as result of the desire to display unity through unanimous votes, some member states which may have decided to negotiate arms transactions with an Israeli company, might find themselves under EU pressure to forgo these deals. However, it is also possible that the prevailing diversity among the EU member states would continue to be a dominant factor in the shaping of Israel-EU defense and security cooperation. Another option of circumventing anti-Israeli political pressure is via the relatively widespread practice of creating partnerships between Israeli companies and local EU companies. For instance, “UTac LTD”, Israeli Elbit’s subsidiary company, is cooperating with “Thales Britain” in a joint project of The British “Watchkeeper” drones project based on Elbit’s “Hermes 450”.

36Another distinctive area of cooperation relates to cooperation in space. For instance, already in 1994 Israel and France signed a cooperation agreement in space projects. In the following years they cooperated inter alia in joint projects such as the satellites Amos (1-4) and Venus. Israel and the EU have also cooperated in the framework of the European Space Agency in projects such as Galileo. This cooperation became possible despite the impediments presented above due to the mutual appreciation for the advanced technologic and scientific capabilities competence of Israel and especially Israel’s remarkable accomplishments in miniaturized space technologies. In addition, the enormous budgets required for accomplishing the space projects favor interstate cooperation. The civil scientific aspect of the activity in space (although the civil and the military capacities are interconnected) has probably neutralized the widespread hostile attitudes within public opinion towards military cooperation with Israel.

Conclusion

37The present article has underlined the duality in Israel-EU defense and security relations. On one hand there are substantial conceptual political-strategic differences on the backdrop of the “Arab Spring”, particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, which produce crises between Israel and the EU. On the other hand, there is defense and security dialogue, in particular between the EU member states and Israel, in view of the growing shared security challenges relating to the upheaval in the Arab world, Iran’s nuclear threat, the global terrorism, the cyber war as well as the global economic crisis.

38In fact, the shared Israel-EU concerns have not necessarily produced common policies. The EU, occasionally, tends to minimize Israel’s genuine security and defense concerns resulting of Israeli explosive and volatile geostrategic environment and the concrete threats against its very existence. On the other hand the EU appreciates the Israeli stable democracy (the only one in the region), its High-Tech industry, its advanced defense industry and its experience in the asymmetric warfare.

39Finally, the defense and security cooperation, between Israel and the EU, though often discreet is significant since it also promotes channels of political dialogue and cooperation which are indispensable in view of the current upheaval in the Middle East.

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Notes

1 For more details on the strategic relations prior to the “Arab Spring” see: Caroline du Plessix, “The European Union and Israel”, Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, December 31, 2011. http://bcrfj.revues.org/6675. Israeli added value to the EU and its member states, Friends of Israel Initiative, The Henry Jackson Society, January 2014. http://www.friendsofisraelinitiative.org/uploads/FOI_Israels_Strategic_Worth_Report_Final.pdf

2 European Commission, EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years, February 8, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm

3 See for example: 3209th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council Meeting, Brussels, December 10, 2012. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20121210_02_en.htm

4 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mepp/index_en.htm

5 Catherine Ashton, Speech on the latest developments in the Middle East & Syria, June 12, 2012. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-436_en.htm

6 See for example: Catherine Ashton, Speech on the Latest Developments in the Middle East & Syria, June 12, 2012. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-436_en.htm

7 See for example: Lazar Berman, Netanyahu: Palestinian Incitement Behind Terror Attack, October 6, 2013. http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-psagot-iran/

8 FM Avigdor Liberman, Joint press conference following 10th EU-Israel Association Council meeting, February 22, 2011. http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/Press_conference_EU-Israel_Association_Council_meeting_22-Feb-2011.aspx

9 Efraim Inbar, The 2011 Arab Uprising and Israel’s National Security, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 95, February 2012. http://biu.ac.il/soc/besa/MSPS95.pdf

10 The Prime Minister’s Speech at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009. http://besacenter.org//wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Netanyahu-Speech-English.pdf

11 Prof. Efraim Inbar, Building in Jerusalem: A Strategic Imperative, BESA Center Perspectives Papers, December 5, 2012, no 190. http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/building-in-jerusalem-a-strategic-imperative/
Nadav Shragai, Protecting the Contiguity of Israel: The E-1 Area, Vol. 9, No. 1 24. May 24, 2009. http://jcpa.org/article/protecting-the-contiguity-of-israel-the-e-1-area-and-the-link-between-jerusalem-and-maale-adumim/
Nadav Shragai, Understanding Israeli Interests in the E1 Area, Contiguity, Security and Jerusalem, June 2013. http://jcpa.org/understanding-israeli-interests-in-the-e1-area/

12 See for example: Nicholas Rostow, Are the Settlements Illegal? The American Interest, March-April 2010. http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=782; Amb, Alan Baker, The European Union – Hypocrisy, Hostility and Blatant Prejudice , Vol. 13, No. 21 July 18, 2013. http://jcpa.org/article/the-european-union-hypocrisy-hostility-and-blatant-prejudice/.

13 Max Singer, Israeli Backers of the Two-State Solution Should Support the Levy Report, April 28, 2013, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 204, http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israeli-backers-of-the-two-state-solution-should-support-the-levy-report-2/

14 Raphael Ahren, EU slams Israel over settlements, but stops short of calling for sanctions, The Times of Israel, December 10, 2012. http://www.timesofisrael.com/eu-slams-israel-over-settlements-but-stops-short-of-calling-for-sanctions/

15 Lazar Berman, "Liberman Summons EU Envoy Over One-Sided Policies, January 17, 2014. http://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-summons-eu-envoys-over-one-sided-policies/

16 Herb Kenon, "Netanyahu: Gov’t okayed E1 planning, not building, December 2, 2012", http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Netanyahu-Govt-okayed-E1-planning-not-building; Harriet Sherwood, Israel defiant on settlements expansion after European condemnation, December 3, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/03/israel-defiant-settlement-expansion-europe.

17 Europe Could Label Settlement Products by Year’s End, July 23, 2013. http://www.timesofisrael.com/europe-could-label-settlement-products-by-years-end/

18 Barak Ravid. July 19, 2013, "Despite Israeli objections, EU officially publishes new settlement guidelines", http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.536812

19 http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/after-u-s-request-eu-delays-decision-to-label-products-from-israeli-settlements.premium-1.524644

20 Herb Keinon, Israel, EU agree to keep talking on settlement guidelines, October 9, 2013. http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Israel-EU-reach-agreement-in-meeting-over-settlement-guidelines-325767

21 Tsilla Hershco, Sarkozy’s Policy in the Middle East: A Break with the Past?, Insight Turkey, vol 11, no 2, 2009, p. 87. http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_11_no_2_2009_hershco.pdf See also: Oded Eran, The Impact of Operation Cast Lead on Israel-EU Relations, April 2009, http://www.fes.org.il/src/PaperOdedEran(6).pdf

22 Catherine Ashton, Speech on the latest developments in the Middle East & Syria, June 12, 2012. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-436_en.htm

23 EU HR Ashton deeply concerned by escalating violence in Israel and Gaza, November 16, 2012. http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_12862_en.htm

24 Elad Benari, Ashton Calls on Israel to End Gaza 'Siege', June 21, 2013, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/169155#.Ujg6iNLwnlY; Prof. Ruth Lapidot, The Legal Basis of Israel’s Naval Blockade of Gaza, July 18, 2010. http://jcpa.org/article/the-legal-basis-of-israel%E2%80%99s-naval-blockade-of-gaza/

25 Aaron Kalman, EU Denies It May Remove Hamas from the Terror List, December 4, 2012. http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-claims-europe-considers-removing-it-from-terror-list/

26 EU hails Fatah-Hamas deal, says peace talks priority, April 24, 2014 http://www.timesofisrael.com/eu-hails-fatah-hamas-deal-says-peace-talks-priority/

27 Catherin Ashton, Speech by EU HR Ashton on the situation in Egypt, September 11, 2013. http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_13931_en.htm

28 Amos Harel, Israel believes Hamas won’t hesitate to attack again, despite growing isolation, September 23, 2010. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.548331

29 Israel Defense Forces, "IDF Soldiers Unveil Terror Tunnel in Gaza Once Again", March 21, 2014. http://www.idfblog.com/2014/03/21/idf-soldiers-unveil-terror-tunnel-gaza-2/. Gili Cohen, "Israeli army uncovers 'most advanced ever' Gaza tunnel", March 21, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.581103Gili

30 Terrorism info org, 20.9. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20573/H_076_13_669665828.pdf

31 "Foreign fighters from Western countries in the ranks of the rebel organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in Syria" January 2014, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20616/E_208_13_409304481.pdf

32 European External Action Service, Frequently Asked Questions on EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime, September 13, 2011. http://eeas.europa.eu/syria/docs/faq_en.pdf

33 Council of the European Union, November 19, 2012, Council Conclusions on Syria, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133598.pdf

34 Space War, Row on arming Syria rebels deeply divides EU, May 25, 2013. http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Row_on_arming_Syria_rebels_deeply_divides_EU_999.html

35 Syrian chemical weapons attack a war crime, says EU, September 7, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/07/barack-obama-syria-iraq. Tsilla Hershco, France and the Syrian Civil War: From Diplomacy to Military Intervention?, September 8, 2013. http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/france-syrian-civil-war-diplomacy-military-intervention/

36 Netanyahu: Israel won’t intervene in Syria if not targeted, June 9, 2013. http://www.jta.org/2013/06/09/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/netanyahu-israel-will-not-intervene-in-syria-if-not-targeted#ixzz2fjpwBnoE

37 http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/171589#.UkBmNtLwnlY

38 Calev Ben-David & Glen Carey, Syria Threat Over Israel Air Strike Risks Wider Conflict, May 6, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-05/syria-says-israelis-jets-strike-sending-fireball-over-damascus.html

39 E.B. Picali, "Rift In Hizbullah And Among Its Shi’ite Supporters Due To Its Military Involvement In Syria", October 3, 2013. http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/259/0/7438.htm

40 Raphael Aaren, Why won’t Europe state the obvious about Hezbollah?, February 6, 2013. http://www.timesofisrael.com/why-wont-europe-state-the-obvious-about-hezbollah/

41 EU adds Hezbollah’s military wing to terrorism list, July 22, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-eu-hezbollah-idUSBRE96K0DA20130722

42 Ulrike Putz, EU Terror List, Hezbollah Unlikely to feel Sanctions, July 22, 2013. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eu-terrorist-group-designation-to-have-little-impact-on-hezbollah-a-912448.html

43 See for example: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/iran/

44 European Union foreign affairs head Catherine Ashton to meet Iran nuclear negotiator, August 18, 2013. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/468103/eus-ashton-urges-irans-new-fm-to-resume-nuclear-talks. EU sets stage for Iran-US breakthrough, September 24, 2013. http://euobserver.com/foreign/121543 . Jodi Rudoren, Israel and Others in Mideast View Overtures of U.S. and Iran With Suspicion September 29, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/world/middleeast/israel-and-others-in-mideast-view-overtures-of-us-and-iran-with-suspicion.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

45 Barak Ravid, French, British diplomats tell Israel that interim deal possible with Iran, October 10, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.551562

46 Netanyahu urges Britain and France not to ease sanctions on Iran, October 12, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/12/uk-iran-nuclear-israel-idUKBRE99B0AC20131012. Security Cabinet Statement, October 15, 2013. http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokekabinet151013.aspx

47 Tsilla Hershco, France and the Iranian Nuclear Project, November 14, 2013, BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 222. http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/france-iranian-nuclear-program/ (Hebrew).

48 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/24/iran-nuclear-idUSL5N0J904U20131124

49 Dan Williams, Reuters, Israel denounces Iranian nuclear deal, says assessing options, October 24, 2013. Israel denounces Iranian nuclear deal, says assessing options. http://in.news.yahoo.com/israel-denounces-iranian-nuclear-deal-says-review-options-062947907.html. Harriet Sherwood, Israeli ministers rush to condemn Iran nuclear deal, November 24, 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/israeli-ministers-condemn-iran-nuclear-deal

50 The European Foreign and Security Policy: Common Policies or aggregation of national diplomacies, European Issues No. 299, foundation Robert Schuman, January 20, 2014. http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0299-the-european-foreign-and-security-policy-common-policy-or-an-aggregation-of-national-diplomacies

51 For the strategic dialogue with France see: Tsilla Hershco, French-Israeli security cooperation in the twenty first Century, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, July 2013, p. 7 (Hebrew). http://besacenter.org/mideast-security-and-policy-studies/french-israeli-security-cooperation-in-the-twenty-first-century-hebrew/. Hence: Hershco, French-Israeli Security cooperation. See also summary in English: http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/MSPS101_English-Summary.pdf
For the Strategic dialogue with Britain see for example: UK embassy in Israel, https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/increasing-security-with-israel
"Third round of UK Israel strategic dialogue held in Jerusalem", July 7, 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/third-round-of-uk-israel-strategic-dialogue-held-in-jerusalem
For the strategic dialogue with Germany, see: Israel Foreign Affairs Ministry, Bilateral agreements reached at first Israeli-German intergovernmental consultations, March  17, 2008. http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Bilateral%20agreements%20reached%20at%20first%20Israeli-German%20intergovernmental%20consultations%2017-Mar-2008.aspx; Ibid, UK hosts fourth strategic dialogue with Israel, November 5, 2012 . https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hosts-fourth-uk-israel-strategic-dialogue

52 Shaon Pardo and Joel Peters, Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union, Lexington Books, 2010, pp. 66-67. http://books.google.co.il/books?id=FTMAfangvdUC&pg=PA64&lpg=PA64&dq=Israel+and+the+EU+held+a+dialogue+on+weapons+control&source=bl&ots=1uBl0nrp8S&sig=pFmynaj8oaJ5nZJn47OsmV0MHk4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Qsc5Us_GLKiL7Aa4_YGYBA&ved=0CFwQ6AEwCDgU#v=onepage&q=Israel%20and%20the%20EU%20held%20a%20dialogue%20on%20weapons%20control&f=false

53 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The European Union Upgrades its Relations with Israel, June 16, 2008, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/The%20EU%20and%20Israel%20upgrade%20relations%20%2016-June-2008.aspx.; Ibid, EU ministers vote to upgrade diplomatic dialogue with Israel, December 9, 2008, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/EU_to_upgrade_diplomatic_dialogue_with_Israel_9_Dec_2008.aspx

54 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DFM Ayalon Opens Strategic Dialogue , September 6, 2010. http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2010/Pages/DFM-Ayalon-opens-Israel-EU-strategic-dialogue-6-Sep-2010.aspx

55 Rachel Oswald, EU Urges 2013 Conference on Mideast WMD-Free Zone, January 18, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/eu-calls-2013-conference-mideast-wmd-free-zone/; Reuters, "US pans Arab push to single out Israel for alleged nuclear arsenal", September 17, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/US-Arab-push-to-single-out-Israel-over-alleged-nuclear-arsenal-would-hurt-efforts-to-ban-WMDs-in-the-Middle-East-326410; Karafillis Gianoulis, EU wants the establishment of a Middle East WMD Free Zone, July 2, 2013. http://www.neurope.eu/article/eu-wants-establishment-middle-east-wmd-free-zone

56 See for example: IDF Chief of the General Staff Makes Historic Visit to Germany, November 7, 2013. http://www.idfblog.com/2013/11/07/idf-chief-general-staff-makes-historic-visit-germany/

57 Anshel Pfeffer, Israel hosts Italian Air Force for joint training exercise December 17, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-hosts-italian-air-force-for-joint-training-exercise-1.401991. Arie Egozi, Israeli, Greek air forces to stage more joint exercises, January 20, 2012. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/israeli-greek-air-forces-to-stage-more-joint-exercises-367146/. Yoav Zitun, Yoav Zitun, IAF, Polish Air Force hold joint exercise, March 14, 2012. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4203138,00.html. IDF, Israeli Italian air forces drill together, February 10, 2013 http://www.idf.il/1283-18266-EN/Dover.aspx

58 Anshel Pfeffer, "Israel Air Force conducts drills for long range attack", November 2, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-air-force-conducts-drills-for-long-range-attacks-1.393325

59 Hershco, French-Israeli Security cooperation.

60 Germany Sells Israel more Dolphin Subs, July 15, 2013, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/germany-may-sell-2-more-dolphin-subs-to-israel-for-117b-01528/

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Tsilla Hershco, « Israel-EU Security and Defense Relations in the Context of the “Arab Spring” », Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem [En ligne], 25 | 2014, mis en ligne le 01 décembre 2014, Consulté le 29 mai 2016. URL : http://bcrfj.revues.org/7306

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Tsilla Hershco

Dr. Tsilla Hershco, historian and political scientist, Senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center, Bar Ilan University. Published inter alia: Between Paris and Jerusalem, France, the Zionist Movement and Israel: 1945-1949, preface by Mr. Shimon Peres, The Editions of the Defense Ministry, December 2000 (Hebrew). Entre Paris et Jérusalem, Honoré Champion Publishers, Geneva and Paris, 2003. Those Who Walk in Darkness will See the Light, The Jewish Resistance in France During the Holocaust and the Creation of Israel: 1940-1949, The Center for Defense Studies, Yad Israel Galili, Ramat Efal and Tcherikover, 2003 (Hebrew). French Policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict during the Second Intifada, 2000-2005, Mideast Security and Policy Studies N° 68, July 2006 (Hebrew). France and the Crisis in Lebanon: July 2006-July 2008, Mideast Security and Policy Studies N° 81, Begin-Sadat Center, 2009 (Hebrew) http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/MSPS81.pdf. Israel-France Defense and Security Cooperation in the 21st Century, (Hebrew, July 2013).Dr Tsilla Hershco, historienne et politiste, chercheuse associée au Centre Begin-Sadat (BESA) d'Études Stratégiques, Université Bar Ilan. Elle a publié entre autres : Entre Paris et Jérusalem, la France, le sionisme et la création de l’État d’Israël : 1945-1949, Les Éditions du Ministère de la Défense, Tel-Aviv, décembre 2000 (en hébreu) ; Entre Paris et Jérusalem, la France, le sionisme et l’établissement de l’État d’Israël : 1945-1949, Les Éditions Honoré Champion, Genève, Paris, 2003 (préface de Shimon Peres) ; Ceux qui marchent dans les ténèbres verront la lumière, la Résistance juive en France, la Shoah et la renaissance d'Israël : 1940-1949, Le Centre de recherche historique, Yad Israel Galili, et les éditions Tcherikover, Tel-Aviv (2003, en hébreu) ; La politique française à l'égard du conflit israélo-palestinien durant la deuxième Intifada, 2000-2005, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, n° 68, Centre Begin-Sadat, 2006 (hébreu) ; La France et la Crise au Liban, 2006-2008, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, n° 81, Centre Begin-Sadat, 2006 (hébreu) ; La coopération de défense et de sécurité franco-israélienne dans le 21ème siècle, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, n° 101, Centre Begin-Sadat, 2013 (hébreu).

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